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18
... and Law?
John Henry Schlegel

No more than they can we suppress
The universal wish to guess
Or slip out of our own position
Into an unconc erned condition.
W. H.Aud en
LAW LIKE LOVE

That law must partake in some kind of formalism is obvious. But
the importance of any particular formalism is an entirely different matter.
Currently the
elementary form of Anglophone law is taken to be the mode of
legal thought
that Dunca n Kennedy calls "Classical Legal Thoug ht." Howev
er, there is
another possibility. There were at least two earlier formalisms:
the writ system, where all legal knowledge was hung on one or another of
the writs, and
Protestant Baconianism, where all legal knowledge was tested agains
t scripture
(Schweber 1999). Thus, classical legal though t may not have arisen
full-blown
from the head of Savigny, but in response to some perceived inabili
ty of law
to dictate the terms of its use under one or both earlier formalisms.
In America, legal realism is usually taken to be the "social" antithe
sis of
classical legal thought. Again, there is another possibility. Roscoe
Pound's
sociological jurisprudence, realism, legal process, and the
earlier and
continuing Restatement project too, may all have been respon
ses to some
perceived inability of law to dictate· the terms of its use under
classical legal
thought. All can be seen as having been designed to shore up
the fortunes
of law as capital, social capital, networks of influence, and
professional
imperatives continued to become more important ways of orderin
g, not just
economic, but also social life.
On this understanding, "contemporary legal thought" may
then be
understood as the unsteady persistence of two among many
possible
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formalisms - classical legal thought and what Duncan Kennedy calls "the
social"- neither of which is sufficient to dictate law's use. The two have been
combined in the hope that together they will do better than either one separately. If this is so, then the emergence of contemporary legal thought might
be seen as but another step in the declining importance oflaw, though not of
lawyers. Instead of the imperialism implicit in the locution "law and ... " one
of the social sciences, at this point it may be that law is the dutiful dependent
walking a few steps behind its betters, as in " ... and law." I shall explore this
possibility.

1

Years ago I was one of the few people active in the U.S. critical legal studies
movement who was also active in the Law and Society Association. Even
though the Law and Society crowd was largely pushed out at our first meeting,
it seemed to me that the social scientists active in Law and Society had
interesting things to say about law that were relevant to the critical project.
Eventually I gave up on the Law and Society Association because I had become
tired of hearing the same old stories repeated year after year. All that one heard
were laments about "the law on the books and the law in action," as if Roscoe
Pound hadn't played that topic out back in the 1920s. Thus, I suppose that it
may be seen as implausible for me to start exploring the possible ascendance of
" ... and law" by looking at recent work by a prominent law and society scholar,
Robert Nelson, former director of the American Bar Foundation. Still, doing
so may help clarify the limitations of "law and ... "
A while ago Bob brought to SUNY/Buffalo Law School a piece on the
effectiveness of employment discrimination law (Nelson 2011). Methodologically it was very sophisticated. Substantively it was less interesting. It showed
that modest changes in the procedure for addressing employment discrimination claims produced modest but positive changes in outcomes for plaintiffs
in these cases. I asked Bob, an old acquaintance, what in his research was
"news"? He pointed to several methodological improvements. When I asked
more pointedly about substance, he got a bit angry. I suppose that the anger
was appropriate, as I had suggested that he had found the square wheel again the law in action had not lived up to the law in the books. No surprises
here.
My question was informed by the fact that more than twenty-five years
earlier Stewart Macaulay had tried to go beyond this tired trope (Macaulay
1984). He asserted, I think quite correctly, that research into law and society
had demonstrated seven things:
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1.
2.

3·

4·
5·
6.
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Law is not free.
Law is delivered by actors with limited resources and interests of their
own in settings where they have discretion.
Many of the functions performed by what usually are thought of as alternative institutions are legal, and there is a great deal of interpenetration
between what we call the public and private sectors.
People, acting alone and in groups, cope with law and cannot be
expected to comply passively.
Lawyers play many roles other than adversary in a courtroom.
Our society deals with conflict in many ways, but avoidance and evasion
are important ones.
While law matters in American society, its influence tends to be indirect,
subtle, and ambiguous.

Fifteen years later Frank Munger offered sound additions to Stewart's list
(Munger 1998):
8. The perceptions and consciousness of actors are important to law.
9· The State is a contested and problematic category.
10. Changes in the nation-state and global markets are, in large part, a
terrain of struggle for power.
n. Legal practice is a domain of contest and cultural production.
12. Law is an element in the social construction of everyday life.
13. Law is given content and meaning by actors with biography, in settings
that have a history, and thus a social organization, of their own.
14. Somehow the myth of neutral, autonomous law has been maintained.
15. Lawyers are producers of culture within the limits of their roles in
political and economic institutions.
All of this is more than modestly interesting, yet there is a glaring absence from
the list. Among all the whats and the hows, there are no whys.
Once one notices them, absences are usually interesting. In this case one
might begin with a diatribe about the refusal of much the law and society
literature to go much deeper than the usual liberal categories about race,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and poverty, as if the erasure of prejudicial
ascriptive categories would somehow bring the law in the books to match the
law in action. But such a diatribe, although fun, would not be any more
enlightening than the list itself. The real difficulty with such a list is the level
of abstraction it occupies: neither concrete enough to be useful in individual
circumstances, nor general enough to constitute a theory that might help to
understand great swaths of circumstances.

... and Law?
I might generalize all fifteen, and so the core of all of the law and society
research since the 192os, by again offering Alan Freeman's observation that got
him into so much trouble way back in the days of the CLS critique of rights
(Freeman 1988). He argued that rights weren't all that they were cracked up to
be, an assertion that seems quite obviously correct. Rights are a good second
best. Still better is cultural acceptance and so approval of one's activities such
as would make the need to rely on rights, on law, largely superfluous. If the
culture is with you, even bits of law like tort and contract will be unnecessary
to getting an OK deal unless interacting with, or as, real thieves and charlatans.
As a personal matter I put Alan's observation somewhat more generally
when I tell students that law follows (the dominant) culture, and if not, culture
modifies law. But either locution asserts that the space between the law on the
books and the law in action is a cultural space where law is shaped, both resisted
and advanced. I would also add that it is a necessary space for a modestly free
society. A society in which there was no space between the law on the.books
and the law in action would be, by definition, a totalitarian society, a society
where resistance is futile and any other shaping as well. This is the land of the
Borg.
Still, neither Alan nor I have ever tried to answer the why question either. For
both of us, it was simply obvious that law was often, maybe always, overridden
by other factors alive and active in this, if not any, society. As Alan loved to
put it, on the text of the Constitution capitalism is unconstitutional, but we
all know that this is not true. Contemporary legal theory seems not to have
absorbed what was obvious to both of us, and so it is time to ignore Al Katz's
only Command ment, "Never commit a sociology," and attempt to look at
an example of the range of factors that invariably overwhelm law, that might
make " ... and law" a more plausible locution than "law and ... "
Here it is best to start with a critical legal studies truism. Law could always
have been, and always could become, otherwise. Contract law could have
started with "good faith" and "just price." It would just have been, and in
principle might still become, a different contract law. In the early CLS days
Duncan suggested a reason for why things are as they are. It was the "fundamental contradiction" between the self and the other, an ontology that I rather
like- or, put differently, between the self and the community , a bit more of
an Aristotelian inflected ontology (Kennedy 1976). But rather rapidly Duncan
backed off (Kennedy 1984).
Pierre Schlag has long argued to me that Duncan did so when he realized
the possibility that the fundamental contradiction would lead to just another
example of what Pierre calls spam jurisprudence (Schlag 2009). That is possible, but at the same time it should be remember ed that an ontology too
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might be made manifest in the world with many different inflections, just as
is the case with contract law. Indeed, an ontology may have a "tilt," to use
Marty Horwitz's phrase (Holt 1983). But there is a difference between a tilt
and necessary content. It is the space between the possibility that law might
be otherwise and any notion of its necessary content, the place where one
can identify tilt and so try to understand it, where things get complex and the
multifariousness of life overwhelms the simplicity of law - the place where
answers to "why" might be sought.

2

I wish to focus on the space between possibility and necessity by examining
a small, but topical, portion of my favorite topic, money ... not what it is or
how it might be legally configured, but as a modest example of things that law
confronts every day in every way and yet quite implausibly, if understandably,
ignores. My topic is going to be the United States' banking sector, as in the
banking practices that led to the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. To do
so, it is essential to start with basics.
It is absolutely true that there is no such thing as a natural market. All
markets are delineated by legal rules. Indeed, markets would not exist without
such rules. At the same time, rules might possibly delineate a market in which
there was no activity because no one with plausible resource endowments
had any interest in participating. Thus, it is also true that without the patterns
of behavior of the humans participating in a market in response to whatever
rules there are, even "illegal" markets could not be identified. Or to put it
somewhat differently, markets cannot be separated from the activities of the
humans whose transactions instantiate the market's rules (Schlegel2oo9). And
it is this obdurate humanness that makes law's "ruling,"~ term I just made up,
markets so difficult.
Consider the attempt to rule financial markets in the wake of the Great
Recession. "Everybody knows," as Leonard Cohen remarks, that the financial
crisis was caused by securities filled with subprime mortgages that had been
fraudulently sold to unsuspecting consumers. And to a certain extent "the dice
were loaded" in just this way. But subprime mortgages, although evidence of a
grotesque human disaster, were only the smallest piece of the problem caused
by the decline in value of mortgage-backed securities. Nor was the crisis caused
by the drive to increase home ownership, something else everybody knows.
The rise in homeownership during the relevant years would account for but
a small piece of the tsunami of mortgages that were turned into mortgagebacked securities. Rather, the vast majority of these mortgages came from
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three sources - the normal movement of Americans into new houses, and so
new mortgages, when changing location; the action of mortgagees tapping
into the equity in their homes either to finance current or past living expenses
or to reduce their monthly mortgage payments by refinancing their mortgages
(I will come back to this); and small-time investors buying multiple dwellings
(usually condos in Arizona, Florida, or Nevada) with the expectation of being
able to resell them at a profit in six months to a year.
So, if most of the mortgages were entered into for quite ordinary reasons,
why were investors buying mortgage-backed securities at such a feverish clip?
Well, you may remember there was a bit of a bubble in technology stocks
going into the year 2000. When that bubble burst, the Federal Reserve Board
drove interest rates down in order to support the rest of the economy that
had not enjoyed much of the boom. This was a perfectly ordinary example of
liberal economic theory in action. However, while driving interest rates down
had the intended effect of making it easier for people to borrow, it necessarily
had the simultaneous effect of making it difficult for lenders to make money
the old-fashioned way -lending. To understand how this was so, one needs to
understand the finance behind banking.
Banking is actually a rather hard way to make a living, remarkably like
running a grocery store. In both businesses the return on assets -for banking,
the difference between the rate paid on deposits and other debt and the rate
earned on loans, and for groceries, the difference between what is paid for
canned and packaged goods and what those goods are sold for - is about
1 percent. For grocery stores this spread pays for facilities and employees as
well as debt service and an equity return; for banks it pays for the same items.
Such a slim return on assets is a very scary place for capital to find itself, far
too close to bankruptcy to sleep well at night. For grocery stores the attempt
to escape from such meager returns is to be found in the great proliferation
of nongrocery items in the aisles ... cards, drugs and sundries, lawn furniture,
linens, and so on, all of which enjoy a spread greater than that on canned
and packaged goods. For banks the equivalent extra earnings are quite a bit
simpler ... fees of kinds too numerous to mention. In this story - there are
many others about banks - the relevant fees are the fees earned in the process
of securitizing mortgages.
The securitization of mortgages was a cash (fee) cow for banks, and a cash
cow that made its way straight to the bottom line of the income statement
in the quarter earned, not in dribs and drabs over the life of a loan - and
with no default risk, either, because the fees were paid up front, as a part of
the transaction. Unfortunately, fee income is much like most dubiously legal
drugs. A little raises earnings per equity share and so raises stock price, but the
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contemporary stock market is an example of the old line, "But what ha'l(e you
done for me lately?" It is steady earnings growth that is rewarded. The market
does not like surprises, particularly surprises such as flat or declining earnings.
Thus, juicing returns with a little fee income in one quarter means increasing
such income in the next quarter and again the following quarter and so on
and so forth. Fee income is addictive.
One might argue that the income from mortgage loans, traditionally a
relatively stable minimum-risk investment, could be equally addictive. Unfortunately, individual residential mortgage loans are not readily saleable and so
were seen by bank regulators as requiring a significant capital reserve, thus
reducing their attractiveness as an investment. Equally troubling for bankers,
if contemplating the sale of these loans, actual value could vary based on the
difference between the rate of interest embedded in the mortgage and the current prime rate of interest. Thus, what seemed to many outside the banking
world as assets of a stable (face) value were an asset of quite variable value.
They were a part of the business, but not in themselves addictive.
In response to the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 198os and '9os, banks
worked to mitigate these two problems. They increased the sale of mortgages to
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, federally chartered entities designed to finance
bank lending for home mortgages, and shifted as many borrowers as possible
to adjustable-rate mortgages that would track the prime rate and so maintain
a stable value. Securitization turned out to be another route to the same end.
Banks would sell illiquid mortgages into a securitization entity- think trust.
Once inside such an entity, the entity could sell securities that other banks
and other investors could purchase. To the seller bank this set of transactions
had turned an illiquid, high-reserve asset into assertedly liquid securities with
a lower reserve requirement. Banks thus might reduce required reserves raising leverage, always a good thing until it is not- and at the same time both
secure a comfortable return on securities collateralized with mortgages and
earn fees for assembling and packaging the securities.
Interestingly, it turned out that if the resulting securities were structured
properly (tranched), all sorts of other entities were interested in them pension plans, college and university endowments, insurance companies,
mutual funds, trust accounts, municipalities, even individual investors, not
to mention foreign banks, foreign central banks, and even sovereign wealth
funds. Why? Because in a low-rate environment, the managers of these entities could also "juice" returns, the measure by which they sold their services,
by purchasing "yield." Because the best contemporary financial economics
assured one and all that, when properly structured, most of these securities
were all but risk free, who would not want some higher yield, lower risk
securities in their portfolio?
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Looked at more carefully, the answer was that not only these institutions
wanted mortgage-backed securities, but also almost anyone who had almost
any financial assets other than a savings account wanted them, too. Stocks and
debt securities underpinned the financial future of almost the entire middle
class- blue collar, white collar, and professional, working and retired. Pretty
nearly all of these people (and their economic "betters") were either direct or
indirect beneficiaries of mortgage securitization or of bank profits mediated
by someone's ownership of bank stocks. Bank executives and some of their
employees made out like bandits (and many still do), but in the grand scheme
of things the rest of us were at least petty thieves.

3
Why did I tell you all of this? Well, there is plenty oflaw in my little recap of the
late unpleasantness, primarily banking and securities, but also bits of trust and
pension law. But separating all of this out from what else is to be found in this
story is no mean trick. Buried in it are many things. One might pull out aspects
of the discipline of accounting, but in the interest of your reading on, I will
leave them buried. However, three other buried things deserve exhumationfinancial economics, shifts in our understanding of class, and some of the
people who made the mortgage securitization enterprise run. All of these are
among the heads and feet that instantiate the law/economy in which my story
is anchored.
The closest thing to an identifiable academic discipline in my story is
the bit played by the people who do financial economics. The growth of
financial economics starts with the post-World War II effort of the Ford
Foundation to improve management school education - to make it more
scientific, an enterprise that led to putting money into finance departments
there. The drive to improve these departments brought greater formalism to
the study of finance. It simplified, made linear, understandings of finance so
as to make it easier to obtain results that allowed for predicting single, stable
equilibriums, taken to be the model of true scientific understanding. When
tied to a similar movement in economics departments that emphasized the
rational actor model of economic behavior, the easiest thing for both groups
of scholars to do was to assume a normal distribution of economic outcomes,
if only because much was already known about the statistical properties of the
normal distribution. Any nonlinear formalism would have produced multiple
equilibriums, hardly a result that would bring positive attention to this growing
discipline.
One result of these assumptions, fueled in part as they were by the politics of
tenure and status in the university, as well as consulting opportunities, was the
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development of some math that asserted that a big enough bundle of properly
diversified mortgages could be used to create a species of securities whose risk
of ownership was much less than that of owning any one of the constituent
mortgages. This bit of essentially well-meaning noodling- to the extent that
academic empire building can ever be seen as well-meaning - had the odd
effect of nearly bringing down the entire banking system because it treated
states of affairs that were remarkably easy to create as highly implausible. So
the people who developed academic financial economics had something to
do with the disaster that was the Great Recession, though they were hardly
alone in their efforts.
A change in the nature of work and the meaning of class in the twentieth
century made its own contribution. The strong economy of the post-World
War II years, though really a hothouse economy built on the relative economic
impotence of both the losers in that war and all of the other winners, and on
the position of the dollar as the world's reserve currency, allowed the United
States to expand its middle class downward. For the first time we had a broad,
blue-collar or hourly middle class. This was an ascriptive identity that workers
had sought to reestablish since it was destroyed in the nineteenth century,
when craftwork centered in the master/apprentice relationship was replaced
by industrial production methods.
Unfortunately, almost as soon as this expansion happened, the economy on
which it depended began to come apart. High-wage work, the work that made
for the experience of a near middle-middle class life style, and so the place of
this new piece of the middle class, began to disappear as wartime allies and foes
began to export cheaper substitutes for American-made goods. The substitutes
were gobbled up as part of the attempt to maintain a class-appropriate lifestyle,
a tactic that became increasingly important across the middle classes as, in
the late 196os, inflation began to speed up and then to gallop ahead. Sq too
was the increase in the number of two-wage-earner families that undermined
another traditional marker of middle-class membership.
In time, the squeeze on middle-class families moved up the class ladder
as many traditional middle-class managerial jobs disappeared when American
companies attempted to meet competition by shaving costs through flattening
corporate hierarchies, and as small local businesses succumbed to the pressure
of big-box retail stores. Here the attempt to maintain class position often took
the form of "cash-out" refinancing of existing mortgages that used the equity
in single-family homes that I spoke of before to produce cash that was used for
home improvements, college tuition, vacations, or just reducing credit card
debt. When the escalation of home values in many markets abruptly came
to a halt, many of these mortgages, a significant portion of which had been
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packaged into mortgage-backed securities, defaulted as lifestyle living became
insupportable. ·
The peculiar dynamic of class in "classless" America has long been a topic of
academic sociological interest, though more recently displaced in importance
by the dynamics of race. But the dynamic of class is of continuing importance
for understanding the world in which law finds itself, if only because of the
more recent erosion of economic security felt by the children of professional,
and so upper-middle-class, parents. Acting to resist threats to one's class position or to protest the implications of a change in class position, especially when
accompanied by the advance of some people traditionally seen as occupying
a lesser position, is a commonplace of American life. The unrest of skilled
labor in the late nineteenth century and of the Tea Party patriots in the early
twenty-first are obvious examples. Much that can and should be called racism
in contemporary political life is about the subtle and not-so-subtle intersection of race and class position. In sum, class is endlessly inflected by law and
inflects law, too. These multiple and crosscutting dynamics of class position
thus contributed their own part toward bringing about the Great Recession.
Much might be said about the heads and feet, the people who once thrived
among the financial activities that eventually brought banking to a standstill
by causing much of the monetary plumbing of this country to all but shut
down the flow of funds in our wholesale, but not retail, monetary system. Were
they to pay attention, social anthropologists might have much to say about
the "quants," one group of which were the guys (mostly) who designed the
reviled mortgage-backed securities and the endless variations on that themeCLOs, collateralized loan obligations, securities that were packages of loans,
often commercial real estate; COOs, collateralized debt obligations, securities
that were packages of other securities that were packages of previously issued
CMOs, CLOs, and other miscellaneous debt obligations; and even COO
Squareds, securities that were packages of parts of previously issued COO
securities. Another interesting group of quants would be the guys who designed
programs for electronically trading securities. These were the poor relations
of the traders themselves, the gunslingers first popularized by Michael Lewis
(Lewis 1989).
The first two groups seem to have been much like the computer geeks of
Silicon Valley, except that banking start-ups are impossible and so these guys
were never going to get fabulously wealthy, at least unless they became traders,
which some of them did. Some traders, proprietary traders, are given a pot of
bank money and told to use it to make more in some market or other. When
they made money it went straight to their bank's bottom line and so contributed
to the run-up in bank stocks that preceded the Great Recession. Others are
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brokers, but not brokers like real estate brokers or like "my stockbroker." The
former truly match buyers and sellers; the latter service bank clients. No, this
third kind of brokers are "market makers.''
Market makers maintain an inventory of a particular range of securities
and try to profit from a knowledge of where the market is heading, where the
pressure is, whether buyers outnumber sellers or the other way around. They
are the descendants of the market makers that once occupied the posts on the
floor of the almost-lost open outcry system of the New York Stock Exchange.
They were obligated to see that all attempts to purchase or sell were successful,
if only by taking the other side of any trade. These old-style market makers
always made a comfortable profit from their activities, assuming that they were
sufficiently capitalized. The newer variety of market makers was expected to
do just as well. Their profits, too, would go straight to the bottom line.
Because market makers trade constantly and with their bank's money, to
bank regulators they are engaging in inappropriate proprietary trading. To
their banks they are a legitimate part of the activity of running a securities
business, as bank holding companies are permitted to do under applicable law.
This is a part of the endless problems raised by the Volker Rule regulations,
problems that from a regulator's standpoint are a matter of understanding the
word "proprietary," but from a bank's standpoint are a misunderstanding of
what it is to be a bank. This conflict gets focused in the lives of a different
group of bank employees - the finance people (a group that has recently
included a reasonable number of women, and therefore my shift in language
is intentional).
If the quants like to play with formal problems and the traders like to take
risks, the finance types try to manage the tension between both groups, as well
as to keep the bank liquid and solvent and profitable by managing the bank's
balance sheet. They try to maximize leverage with just the amount of risk that
will maintain regulatory compliance, all the while quietly hectoring everyone
to maximize the net income in this quarter so as to meet or exceed market
expectations, which is to say analysts' expectations for the bank's quarterly
profit. Finance types are puzzlers trying to provide each of the bank's divisions
with financial information that will gently, or not so gently, suggest how more
income could be made, how assets are best configured, and how the cost of
·
sources of funding might be minimized.
the
is
it
for
Recession,
Great
All of these groups of people played a part in the
interaction of these (and other) differently motivated and so other interested
people that say more about what banks do than all the compliance officers or
senior managers in a bank. And so, while the anthropologists might help us
understand the interaction of these people and the great panoply of rules and
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regulations governing what banks must do, or at least try to do; the sociologists,
with their understanding of class, might help explain why ordinary Americans
behaved as they did; and the financial economists, with their formal models
that simplified away what turned out to be very important market conditions,
might provide insight into why their models made sense at the time, none of
these groups of scholars could explain this disaster all by themselves.
Political scientists have almost nothing relevant to say about the Great
Recession, other than possibly about the public and informal interactions of
banks, through the actions of their officers and lobbyists with various government personnel -lawmakers and agency personnel. These academics are
really interested in the sausage making that is formal law, whether called
legislation, regulations, or guidance. However, a different group of political ·
theorists scattered around the universities and think tanks believes that a concept they invented and elaborated, "neoliberalism," can explain everything in
American, indeed world, politics, economy, and society, including my little
example.
It is not wholly specious to believe in neoliberalism, but it does require
a stretch of the imagination. After all, the sense of liberalism that it invokes
was almost dead for eighty years. Neoliberalism throws together traditional,
often religiously motivated, social conservatives, with free market fanatics of
various stripes; an anti-tax, anti- anti-discrimination, anti-immigrant, perhaps
racist group of lower middle class individuals who are quite selective in their
objections to governmental social programs; a group of traditional economic
conservatives who are equally selective in their objections to government
economic programs, though not in their objections to income and estate
taxes, environmental as well as occupational safety regulations, and in general
anything that impugns the ultimate goodness of business; and libertarians of
several stripes. Because of the heterogeneity of the assembled multitudes, I am
not persuaded by this particular universal solvent. I leave it for others to fill in
this blank in my analysis. I am sure that many will come forward to do this
work.

4
So, where have we reached in our search for a "why?" After a long discussion
about how banks make money, and so the attractiveness to them of mortgagebacked securities, I looked at financial economics, shifts in our understanding
of class, and some of the people who made the mortgage securitization enterprise run. Both the central story and all of these excursions paid attention to
capital, social capital, networks of influence, and professional imperatives, all
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of which I had highlighted at the outset as significantly important ways of
ordering not just economic, but also social life. I then took a brief excursion
into "neoliberalism" as an explanatory concept. What I hope to have strongly
suggested to the reader is that my excursion into institutional analysis or other
academics' potential discussion of financial economics, sociology, or anthropology, much less political theory, seen as examples of the best that the social
sciences might offer toward understanding the place of banking in The Great
Recession, together may do better at this task than law standing alone. Whether
this better is enough to claim a pride of place such as would justify turning
"law and society" into "society and law" is another matter.
The implausibility of putting a named, perhaps social, but more often asocial, science before law is because science, like law, strives for formal simplicity.
Such simplicity is most often maintained by defining the relevant academic
specialty methodologically. Except in social anthropology, everywhere the
research protocols are pretty much the same. Find a data set - preferably
one someone else has assembled, because publications need to appear regularly, amassing a data set takes a long time and is expensive, and grantors are
cheap - and use the statistical tools that are approved within the discipline to
examine the data set. Don't worry that the simplifications necessary to meet
the methodological imperatives of the approved tools make the research all
but irrelevant to lived experience. After all, ours is a science, and the mark
of a science is the drive for formal elegance. Not surprisingly, this drive for
formality is the reason why law in the books and law in action is so attractive
as an organizing principle for research in the area. The old trope provides a
simple framework in which normal science may do its work. This is why Bob
Nelson said his methodological improvements were the news in his research,
rather than his substantive learning about "law and society" or "society and
law."
At first glance, choosing between competing formalisms would seem to be
like expressing a preference as between Hershey, Nestle, and Godiva chocolate
bars. Still, as best we can know, financial economics, sociology, and political
theory do not directly threaten people's life, liberty, or property in the way
that law can and does. One might argue that the power embedded in this difference should dictate that "law and society" is the proper ordering of words,
though the need to discipline that power may dictate precisely the opposite ordering, "society and law." To me both alternatives seem wrong. Back
in the 192os, the American legal realists could have believed that social science might temper the tyranny oflaw's formalism, but the history of their own
attempts at research makes it clear that even then such a belief was unwarranted
(Schlegel1995). Today only the least mathematical of the socially conscious

... and Law?
disciplines -cultural anthropology and history- might provide such temper,
and it seems to me that both are fighting rearguard actions. So, if law's formalism is to be tempered, it will have to come from inside itself, from a slow
recognition of the declining importance of law, though not of lawyers.
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Let me close with a declaration that follows from this conclusion. It is time
for law school legal theory to stop taking law so seriously. This is not to say
that attention to doctrine and the practices oflawyers should be cast aside for
some other, more important subject. Though law school and legal theorists
might, indeed ought to, do their jobs significantly differently, law school and
legal theorists cannot not focus on doctrine and practices for it, and they
exist to produce lawyers who need to know at least some things about these
topics. Rather, both groups should stop their insistence on the centrality of
law for the organization oflife in the twenty-first century, for the centrality of
contemporary legal theory.
Again, this is not to say that law schools and legal theorists are wrong when
they argue that law provides the scaffolding that supports political institutions,
as well as numerous, if not all, social/economic activities. Rather, that scaffolding does significantly less in either constraining or enabling the rest of life, of
which I have looked at but a teensy piece in discussing large banks, than law
and its noisy mouthpieces have long proclaimed. Law school thus is much
like barber college or beauty school. Because it is important for a person to
have a good haircut, barbers and beauticians need to understand that, whether
the client is naked or clothed, there is a real limit to what a good stylist can
do. Similarly, because it is important for a person to have the best possible
representation, lawyers need to understand that there is a real limit to what a
good lawyer can do.
In daily life even the best law is likely to be overwhelmed by all sorts of other
pieces of the world. The failure of contemporary legal theory to place this limit
front and center in its work makes it quite obvious that, whatever it thinks that
it is doing, what it is doing is hiding the fact that law is unable to dictate
the tenns of its use - perhaps by definition, as would be expected on one
reading of Godel and Wittgenstein. More importantly, constantly working
to make law more effective is just increasing the bureaucratization of law.
More legal process is an ambiguous reward, one that may only increase our
disaffection with law, at least if we are willing to take seriously Grant Gilmore's
prediction that "in Hell there will be nothing but rules and due process will
be meticulously observed" (Gilmore 1977: m).
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John Henry Schlegel
Perhaps it is better to recognize that law, as in part an attempt to live up to
our best aspirations for a just society, will always fail. Failure may be OK, if the
trying, not the substantive aspiration, is the point of law. Contemporary legal
theory, in whatever shape it takes, is going to do no better than its ancestors
at the job of explaining law until it recognizes that the stone will always roll
down the Sisyphean hill. We had better become happy with that fact so that
we may whistle when rolling it up again.
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